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Abstract
The upstream-downstream relationship in international river basins is a traditional chal-
lenge in water management. Water use in upstream countries often has a negative
impact on water use in downstream countries. This is most evident in the classical ex-
ample of industrial pollution in upstream countries hindering drinking water production5
downstream.
The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) gives new impetus to the river
basin approach and to international co-operation in European catchments. It aims
at transforming a mainly water quality oriented management into a more integrated
approach of ecosystem management.10
After discussing the traditional upstream-downstream relationship, this article shows
that the WFD has a balancing effect on upstream-downstream problems and that it
enhances river basin solidarity in international basins. While it lifts the downstream
countries to the same level as the upstream countries, it also leads to new duties
for the downstream states. Following the ecosystem approach, measures taken by15
downstream countries become increasingly more important. For example, downstream
countries need to take measures to allow for migrating fish species to reach upstream
stretches of river systems. With the WFD, fish populations receive increased attention,
as they are an important indicator for the ecological status. The European Commission
acquires a new role of inspection and control in river basin management, which finally20
also leads to enhanced cooperation and solidarity among the states in a basin.
In order to achieve better water quality and to mitigate upstream-downstream prob-
lems, also economic instruments can be applied and the WFD does not exclude the
possibility of making use of financial compensations, if at the same time the polluter
pays principle is taken into account.25
The results presented in this article originate from a broader study on integrated
water resources management conducted at Bonn University and refer to the Rhine and
Elbe basins (Moellenkamp, 2006).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Upstream-downstream relationships in a changing environment
Upstream-downstream relations are a traditional challenge in international river basin
management. In the classical upstream-downstream relationship, represented as a
unidirectional externality, the upstream country profits from the water resource whereas5
the downstream country suffers from pollution and thus restricted water use. Since the
year 2000, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) introduces new background condi-
tions for water management in the European Union, which also influence the upstream-
downstream relationships in international basins. The article at hand focuses on the ef-
fects of the WFD on the upstream-downstream relations in the Rhine and Elbe basins.10
Does the WFD assign new roles to upstream and downstream countries? Is there a
new role for the European Commission in river basin management? In how far does
the ecosystems approach influence the upstream-downstream setting in international
basins? And are compensation payments still possible?
In the following paragraphs, a brief background is given on theoretical aspects of15
upstream-downstream relationships, the study area and approach. Section 2 dis-
cusses the situation prior to the WFD implementation, and especially focuses on the
role of downstream countries for river basin co-operation as well as the instrument of
financial transfers between basin states. Section 3 deals with the effects of the WFD on
upstream-downstream relations, taking into account the role of the downstream coun-20
try, a new role for the European Commission, the hydro-political consequences of the
ecosystems approach and the question of financial compensation. Section 4 presents
the general conclusions.
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1.2 Upstream-downstream relations in river basin management – a theoretical
overview
While river basins can be considered as an entity in hydrological terms, for the most
part their boundaries do not coincide with the political boundaries of nation states or
regions. The mismatch between hydrological and political-administrative boundaries is5
particularly apparent in international river basins, where river basin boundaries cross
administrative boundaries. This mismatch of different spatial scales is often referred to
as “spatial misfit” (Young, 2002).
In international basins, it becomes obvious that the possible use and profit of the
water as well as its impacts on the water use by other basin states depend on the10
geopolitical location of a state in the basin. The situation is characterised by an asym-
metric setting. Different authors have shown that asymmetric upstream-downstream
externality problems are more difficult to solve than common pool resources problems
(Ostrom, 1990) that affect all parties similarly, such as air pollution (Bernauer, 2002;
see also Dombrowsky, 2007a).15
In the classical setting of upstream-downstream relations, especially concerning
questions of water quality, water use of the downstream country is dependent on the
upstream country. In particular this is the case if interests vary, for example in con-
stellations with emissions upstream and drinking water use downstream. In this case,
water use in upstream countries leads to negative effects in downstream countries.20
Water use and water harm belong to different spatial entities and generate “one-sided
international externalities” (Durth, 1996).
In her theoretical article about benefit-sharing in transboundary rivers, Dombrowsky
points out that depending on the water use, these externalities do not only have to be
negative but can also be positive (Dombrowsky, 2007b). A measure taken upstream25
can be positive for the downstream party, such as for example the construction of a
flood detention area or it can have negative effects such as polluted water. As stated
above, externalities in the use of water – positive or negative – have a unidirectional
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character (Rogers, 1993; also see Barrett, 1994) and most of the external effects are
directed downstream.
In case of some uses, the direction of the relationship between the upstream and the
downstream country is in the inverse; that is, the downstream party has more control
than the upstream party. For example, in navigation, the downstream party often has5
a better position than the upstream party due to the importance of the connection to
the sea or to the hydrological situation favouring navigation. In this case, development
of port facilities downstream may benefit upstream countries, thus meaning a positive
externality directed upstream (Barrett, 1994). Dombrowsky gives a detailed economic
and theoretical analysis of different typologies of international water management prob-10
lems, also distinguishing the alignment of the hydrological and political boundaries and
the resulting effects.
In the following, the focus is on the upstream-downstream relationship and therefore
on transboundary rivers. Border rivers are not taken into account separately. The
discussion focuses exclusively on blue water, as this is the most important aspect15
for upstream-downstream relationships in the Rhine and the Elbe basins related to
the WFD. Green water flows (Falkenmark, 2000), which are of special importance for
upstream-downstream relations in water scarce areas, will not be discussed.
1.3 Study areas: the Rhine and the Elbe basins
The Rhine and the Elbe basins lie within the heart of the European Union. The majority20
of their catchments lie within Germany, and they are among the most important river
basins for that country. Both are transboundary rivers and flow into the North Sea.
The Rhine basin extends over 185 000 km
2
and encompasses nine states: Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria, Liechtenstein and
Italy (see Fig. 2). 70 Mio. people live within the catchment area. Regarding their25
economic settings, the states in the Rhine basin are located on rather equal level and
most of them have a long history within the European Union. Switzerland, despite not
being a member of the European Union, is nevertheless on equal lines concerning
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economic aspects. The Rhine is used for multiple purposes; it is one of the most
frequented water ways of the world and provides 20 Mio. people with drinking water
(Hofius, 1996; Koordinierungskomittee Rhein, 2004).
The Elbe basin has a catchment area of 148 268 km
2
and is shared by four states:
Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria and Poland; with the latter two encompassing5
less than 1% of the catchment (see Fig. 3). About 25 Mio. people live within the catch-
ment area (FGG Elbe, 2004). During the Cold War, the Elbe symbolised the separation
between the two German states as well as the separation of the whole European con-
tinent (Holtrup, 1999). Cooperation among the basin states only became possible after
the fall of the Iron Curtain and had to cope with high discrepancies between the eco-10
nomic settings of the basin states. With the accession of the Czech Republic to the
European Union in May 2004, a common and broad frame was set, making coopera-
tion a fundamental part of water management and improving the economic situation in
Eastern Europe, though equal economic levels have not yet been reached within the
basin.15
The different geopolitical settings in the two basins result in a very clear upstream-
downstream relationship for the Elbe basin, with the Czech Republic as the upstream
and Germany as the downstream partner. A more complex setting is found in the
Rhine basin, with Switzerland and France as the main upstream partners, Germany in
a middle position and the Netherlands as the downstream partner. Germany thus holds20
differing positions in the two basins, which makes it an interesting country to focus on.
1.4 Study approach
Apart from document study, an empirical approach was chosen to investigate the de-
velopment of the upstream-downstream situation in the Rhine and Elbe basins. To this
aim, methods from qualitative social research were applied.25
Several expert interviews were conducted with water managers and selected water
users from different administrative levels in both basins. The minutes of each inter-
view were validated by the interviewee and evaluated anonymously. The questions on
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upstream-downstream relations were embedded in a broader frame, also investigating
other aspects of integrated water resources management. Apart from the expert in-
terviews, observational studies were conducted in order to complement and validate
insights from interviews, and vice versa.
2 Mitigating upstream-downstream problems – co-operation prior to the WFD5
The aforementioned shows that the countries in an international river basin are interde-
pendent. This means that they are potentially better off if they cooperate in managing
the international water resource. In practice such co-operation is typically codified in
international agreements (Barrett, 1994), which is also the case for the Rhine and Elbe
basins.10
2.1 Co-operation structures in the international Rhine and Elbe basins
Co-operation of the basin states has a long tradition along the Rhine, where the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) was permanently established
in 1963, following the signature of the Berne Convention. During the first decades, the
ICPR member states tried to improve water quality by negotiating international agree-15
ments concerning chlorides and chemical pollution. Since the mid-1980s, the ICPR
has turned to working with non-binding action programs as their main instrument. The
work of the ICPR was evaluated as very successful (for example Gurtner-Zimmermann,
1998; Holtrup, 1999; Dieperink, 2000). Being the goal of the Rhine action program for
the year 2000 (ICPR, 1991), the return of the salmon into the river system was one of20
the most visible outcomes of the co-operation. The ICPR has served as a model for the
development of further river basin commissions, such as the International Commission
for the Protection of the Elbe (ICPE), established immediately after the fall of the Iron
Curtain in 1990. The ICPE has similar structures as the ICPR and has been able to
make use of ICPR’s previous experiences. For example, it was immediately structured25
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to encompass nearly the entire catchment area of the Elbe, instead of just the river
stretch, as was the case for the early Rhine regime (for more information on the Elbe
regime, its “institutional design and regime effectiveness”, see Dombrowsky, 2007c, in
this Special Issue).
After the river basin commissions in the Rhine and Elbe had been established, they5
first tackled the persisting water quality problems that were mainly due to urban and
industrial waste water.
Mitigating water quality problems in the classical upstream-downstream setting
means applying new technical measures for water treatment. Doing so in the up-
stream country has the consequence that the downstream country profits from these10
measures, while the “economically” optimal water use in upstream countries is dis-
turbed (also see Durth, 1996). This is the reason why downstream countries are of
utmost importance for the co-operation in international basins: they are very motivated
to improve water quality. Downstream parties would profit from any treatment measure
taken upstream. Here, compensation payments from the downstream to the upstream15
party are a possible instrument to mitigate upstream-downstream problems, and pos-
sibly to accelerate upstream action.
2.2 Importance of downstream countries for co-operation
While downstream countries often have the role of promoting co-operation in interna-
tional basins, the other countries of the basin might perceive them as a “demanding20
victim” and “profiteur” of the measures for water protection.
In the Rhine and Elbe basins, the downstream countries have always been very pro-
active in engaging in co-operation on water quality management (for the Rhine see
also Dieperink, 2000). Several decades ago, the Netherlands began to argue against
Chloride pollution in the Rhine. This led to several years of bargaining, which resulted25
in an international treaty on Chloride pollution. In the Elbe basin, the downstream
German Land Hamburg engaged after 1990 with the Czech Republic to support the
use of new technologies for water treatment in industrial plants, in order to decrease
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pollution of the aquatic sediments (Moellenkamp, 2006). In general, downstream coun-
tries taking the initiative for improving water quality were often an important impetus for
international river basin co-operation.
It should be mentioned that countries in an international river basin are not only
linked by the joint water resource, but by numerous other international relations. Such5
links can also be the reason why an upstream country takes measures: it may seek
to improve friendly neighbourhood relations (Barrett, 1994). This has also been shown
by Durth, with his principal hypothesis that upstream-downstream asymmetries are
easier to solve when riparian countries are more integrated and the density of politi-
cal, economic, and societal ties among countries is greater (Durth, 1996, analysed in10
Bernauer, 2002). This is also observable in the Rhine and Elbe basins. The countries
of the Rhine basin are in the heart of European integration and thus strongly inter-
twined, and Switzerland, despite not being an EU member state, does not disturb this
constellation. In the Elbe basin, co-operation on water resources only became possi-
ble after 1989, when the fall of the Iron Curtain set the scene for new possibilities of15
co-operation.
2.3 Transboundary financial compensations
One of the possible instruments used to mitigate upstream-downstream problems is
trans-boundary financial compensation. In the classical upstream-downstream situa-
tion, these are directed from the downstream to the upstream party, compensating the20
latter for its investments, for example in waste water treatment technology. In such
a case, compensation payments are paid by the party that profits from the treatment
measure, not by the party responsible for the pollution.
A prominent example of compensation payments in a more complex sense is the
agreement concerning compensation to mitigate salt pollution in the Rhine in the25
1970s. Salt pollution resulted from a wellknown point source in France – a potassium
mine in the Alsace – as well as from several other sources in the basin. As the most
downstream partner, the Netherlands suffered most from the salt pollution and initiated
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a bargaining process between the countries of the basin. A solution was found many
years later: in order to diminish the maximum possible amounts, the riparian states de-
cided to concentrate their joint efforts on the potassium mine in France, a point source
pollution, where measures were most cost-effective. The costs to diminish the salt pol-
lution of that mine were shared between the basin states, reflecting the proportion of5
salt pollution of each single country (Moellenkamp, 2001). Despite various difficulties
during its negotiation and implementation, the Rhine Chloride Convention is important
as it serves as an example for sharing the costs of pollution control among riparians
(Barrett, 1994).
Another instrument to overcome upstream-downstream conflicts is the linkage of10
uses controlled by downstream parties with uses controlled by upstream parties (Dom-
browsky, 2007a). Dombrowsky shows the theoretical possibility of issue linkage in a
river basin when possible compensations from upstream to downstream and vice versa
are the same. For instance, compensation payments from a downstream country to re-
duce pollution in an upstream country could cover the amount of possible compensa-15
tion payments of an upstream country to the downstream party in order to compensate
for its building a fish ladder.
While compensation payments are an important instrument for river basin co-
operation, they are not in use in most of the co-operative actions taken by either the
ICPR or the ICPE. Many of the actions within the international commissions for the20
protection of the Rhine and the Elbe were taken on the basis of voluntary agreements
and action plans, without explicit compensation, but still compensation was a possible
instrument.
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3 The water framework directive and upstream-downstream relations
3.1 The water framework directive – a new approach for European water manage-
ment
Prior to the year 2000, European policies dealing with water resources focused on
setting water quality standards or on controlling emission levels, such as the direc-5
tives on urban wastewater (Council Directive 91/271/EEC) or on integrated pollution
prevention and control (Council Directive 96/61/EC). Other directives were designed
to protect specific endangered species such as the birds directive (Council Directive
79/409/EEC).
Since 2000, the European Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) pro-10
vides an umbrella for European water policy, replacing some of the older directives and
bringing others into a broader context. The overall aim of the WFD is to achieve a
“good status” of surface and ground water by the year 2015. It takes into account the
chemical and ecological status of the river, but also leaves open different possibilities
for exceptions from reaching that status. Altogether, it pursues a more holistic and in-15
tegrative view, in which an ecosystem approach is emphasised, shifting away from a
strong focus on water quality problems.
Furthermore, the WFD requires a river basin approach, obligating the EU Member
States to define river basin districts (Art. 3 WFD) where water management has to take
place. The Rhine and the Elbe were defined as such international river basin districts.20
In some river basin districts, existing co-operation structures were expanded; in others,
new ones were created in order to include all states of the basin. While the WFD
leaves the concrete decision on co-operation structures up to the Member States, it
has promoted the development of new structures among the states of a river basin.
Herewith, it has also brought about changes in the upstream-downstream relationship25
of riparian states.
1417
HESSD
4, 1407–1428, 2007
“WFD-effect” on
upstream-
downstream relations
in international river
basins
S. Moellenkamp
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
◭ ◮
◭ ◮
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
3.2 Organizational implementation of the WFD in the Rhine and Elbe basins
The international agreements for the protection of the Rhine and the Elbe were “incom-
plete” (also see Barrett, 1994) in the sense that the number of parties to the treaties
was less than the number of countries in the river basins. The ICPE already focused on
the whole river basin, including the European Union as a contracting party, but had to5
further include Poland and Austria into its activities. In the Rhine basin, the ICPR only
encompassed Switzerland, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands as well
as the European Union. The other countries of the basin such as Belgium or Austria
were not members and had to be included in the management in order to comply with
the WFD requirements. In the Rhine, the water managers opted at first for the develop-10
ment of new co-operation structures which partly doubled the structures of the ICPR.
Only recently, water managers aim at merging these structures (see Moellenkamp,
2006). Another new development in both basins is the definition of sub-catchment ar-
eas for the operational work (see Figs. 2 and 3). These allow for closer cooperation on
concrete measures and enhance interaction at the regional level.15
3.3 Effects of the WFD on upstream-downstream relations
3.3.1 New roles and duties for downstream countries: co-operation on equal levels
Most of the water managers interviewed in the Rhine and Elbe basins came to the
conclusion that the WFD leads to an improvement of upstream-downstream relations
in the basins.20
In this respect, the WFD leads to a change in the roles of the countries in a basin:
while traditionally the downstream country used to be the motor of the co-operation,
the relations in the basin now become more equal. The WFD strengthens the position
of the downstream country (see Holzwarth and Bosenius, 2002) and lifts it onto the
same level as the other basin states. The WFD thus also strengthens the feeling of be-25
longing to a community and the need to work on common problems. Former upstream-
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downstream problems are now more easily transformed into collective problems that
need to be solved together by all countries of the basin (also see Durth, 1996). The
states of the basin today feel a certain “joint responsibility” for the implementation of
the WFD.
At the same time, downstream parties have the same tasks and duties in river basin5
management as upstream countries. This also concerns transparency of monitoring
data which must be reported to the European Commission. Today, all countries of the
basin must take measures to protect the water resources, and make these measures
and monitoring data transparent.
3.3.2 Strengthened river basin solidarity and new external control10
Apart from strengthening the downstream country, a new role is taken over by the
European Commission. While the Commission was already a signatory to the Rhine
and Elbe conventions, it now additionally takes over the role of control and inspection.
Though direct co-operation with the EU-Commission is generally considered as good
by the states in the Rhine and Elbe basins, “Brussels” is now being perceived as the15
common opponent by all states of the basin (see Moellenkamp, 2006). With the WFD,
the European Commission has become a new and higher level instance for river basin
management. The EU-Commission, rather than the downstream country, can now be
“blamed” for the need of investments, such as in new treatment technologies.
Together with cooperation on equal level, this external control leads to enhanced20
river basin solidarity among the states of an international basin. This solidarity is also
linked to general European integration, as EU Member States interact on nearly all
aspects. The integration in river basins must thus be seen against the background of
more general international relations (also see Barrett, 1994).
Furthermore, the WFD encourages a common perception and interpretation of water25
management questions. Besides the binding directive, numerous informal guidance
documents have been issued by the EU Member States together with the European
Commission, giving a common ground for the interpretation and implementation of the
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WFD.
The WFD gives impetus to the basin states to tackle problems on a common ground
and to jointly search for solutions. Durth even states that in the Rhine basin, problems
of upstream-downstream nature have already been changed into public goods issues
before WFD implementation (Durth, 1996). It can be confirmed here that the WFD5
reinforces and institutionalises this development.
Co-operation in the basins of the Rhine and the Elbe has been ongoing for several
years now and an atmosphere of trust has been established. Despite the younger
history of co-operation in the Elbe basin, a German interview partner judges the current
co-operation as being better than the one in the Rhine.10
3.3.3 The ecosystem approach of the WFD – does it cause new upstream-
downstream dichotomies?
Aiming at pursuing a holistic management, the WFD follows an ecosystem approach.
Its focus goes far beyond a good chemical water quality, and aims at achieving a good
ecological status of the water bodies. This means that not only emissions need to be15
reduced, but also ecosystems have to be restored – throughout the basin. Aquatic
organisms should be able to migrate within a river system. This especially requires
that downstream countries take specific action. For example, downstream weirs need
to be passable for fish, often revealing a need to build fish ladders or other facilities
in order to enable organisms to surmount obstacles. Here, the traditional and water20
quality related upstream-downstream relations are reversed: the downstream coun-
try has to take measures in order not to hinder fish from migrating upstream, as fish
species are important indicators for a good ecological status according to the WFD.
This does not only involve measures linked to hydromorphology, but also water pol-
lution of the downstream country should not cause indirect barriers for migrating fish25
species (Moellenkamp, 2006).
Fish migration was already an issue in the Rhine and Elbe basins before the WFD
came into force. Both international commissions had elaborated programs to reintro-
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duce migrating species such as salmon (Moellenkamp, 2006). But today, the formerly
non-binding goals have in part become new ecological requirements under the WFD.
Fish population is one of the important indicators for a good ecological status, giving
efforts to its restoration a higher priority on the agenda of water managers.
The ecological approach of the WFD thus also leads to a change in the hydropolitical5
constellation in the basin. The requirements for ecological restoration can reverse
the traditional upstream-downstream situation and may lead to new dependencies on
downstream countries, stressing the external effects directed upstream. In practice,
this development will possibly not result in new upstream-downstream dichotomies,
but rather be covered by the increasing river basin solidarity discussed in Sects. 3.3.110
and 3.3.2.
3.3.4 Financial compensation versus polluter pays principle?
As stated above, financial compensation is a possible instrument to overcome
upstream-downstream problems. In the example of the Chloride Convention in the
Rhine basin, mentioned in Sect. 2.3, the financial burden of abating a pollution prob-15
lem was shared among different states in the basin. Today, the WFD brings in a new
institutional framework, emphasising among others, the polluter pays principle (Pream-
ble No. 38 and Art. 9 WFD). Financial compensations in the past are often said to be
inconsistent with this principle. Measures for pollution abatement were not financed
by the polluter, but by the parties who profited from better water quality, or from both20
parties as in the example of the Rhine basin stated earlier.
The question today is whether financial compensation is still possible under the WFD
or not. In fact it is possible, if the polluter pays principle is respected at the same
time. This can be done if compensation is only the second step after the polluter
pays principle had been applied, for example by installing the best available technique.25
Compensation payments can then be used to finance the most cost effective reduction
of the remaining pollution, if the water body is not yet in good condition (also see
Moellenkamp, 2006). Another application could be to combat dangerous wastes from
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the past, for which the polluter is no longer traceable.
At the same time, it has to be considered that besides compensation payments
other instruments to reduce or neutralize existing asymmetries are more easily em-
ployed. This is the case with issue linkages, which are often employed between “in-
tegrated countries”, while compensation seems to be a prerequisite for cooperation in5
non-integrated settings (also see Bernauer, 2002).
The experts interviewed for the study had diverging opinions on the future applica-
tion of financial compensations. Whereas an interviewee from the German Land level
points out that these will no longer be necessary, since the integration of basin states
will become even stronger than today, an interviewee from river basin level has the10
opinion that financial compensation will be used even more than in the past, for exam-
ple in order to jointly finance measures in a basin. The interviewee sees the possibility
that states open up to finance measures in a basin beyond their national boundaries.
These would of course require a strong political will from the member states.
According to Moss, it is of utmost importance for the implementation of the WFD in15
Germany to find mechanisms to share costs in an equitable and efficient way among
the states of a river basin (Moss, 2003). Basin-wide financial instruments can also be
thought of in the sphere of flood protection. In this context, a German interview partner
mentions that currently financial compensation between German La¨nder is being dis-
cussed between upstream and downstream La¨nder. On international level this option20
is not yet an issue but could be integrated in future river basin management plans.
4 Conclusion
Co-operation in the Rhine and the Elbe basins has a long tradition and has for a long
time been based on international commissions. Upstream-downstream problems have
already been diminished by such co-operation in an integrated environment.25
With the WFD, new background conditions for water resources management emerge
which will most probably further reduce upstream-downstream problems.
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Co-operation in international river basins is enhanced and leads to the development
of a river basin solidarity. Downstream countries are lifted to an equal level with the
other countries in the basin and now have the same rights and duties as upstream
countries. The European Commission has taken over an additional role as an instance
of control and inspection in river basin management. The WFD has thus given impetus5
to the basin states to tackle problems on a common ground and to jointly search for
solutions.
While traditional water management has for a long time focused on water quality
management, it now shifts towards more integrated approaches, taking ecological as-
pects into serious account. In this respect, traditional upstream-downstream relations10
can invert, for example if fishes are hindered from migrating upstream by the down-
stream country, which in turn would impede the full implementation of the WFD in the
upstream country. In practice, this would possibly not result in new dichotomies among
the basin states, which have developed a joined understanding of water management
problems.15
In order to overcome any prevailing upstream-downstream dichotomies, financial
compensations are still a possible instrument, if at the same time the polluter pays
principle is taken into account. For future river basin management, questions such as
basin wide financial mechanisms, resulting in more cost-effective measures – indepen-
dent of upstream-downstream positions – should be taken into consideration.20
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Fig. 1. Schematic upstream-downstream relationship in a river basin (Source: own presenta-
tion).
1426
HESSD
4, 1407–1428, 2007
“WFD-effect” on
upstream-
downstream relations
in international river
basins
S. Moellenkamp
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
◭ ◮
◭ ◮
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Fig. 2. The Rhine basin (Source: Umweltbundesamt (modified)).
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Fig. 3. The Elbe basin (Source: Umweltbundesamt (modified)).
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